Smber 14, 1762

DENY

C\_ Date 2/6/90

TS authority to:

() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADR

REVIEWED by QUALE

() DECLASSIFY
(9-DECLASSIFY in PART
() DELETE
() Non-responsive info.

Dear Mr. Chairman

I was glad to have your mossage of December 11th and to know that you believe, as we do, that we have come to the final stage of the Cuben effair between us, the settlement of which will have significance for our future relations and for our ability to overcome other difficulties. I wish to thank you for your expression of approciation of the understanding and flexibility we have tried to display.

I have followed with close attention the negotiations on the final settlement of the Cuben question between your representative, Mr. Kurnetsov, and our representatives, Ambassador Stevenson and Mr. McCley, in New York. In these negotiations we have tried to understand your position and I am glad to note that Mr. Kurnetsov has also shown effort to understand our problems. It is clearly in the interest of both sides that we reach agreement on how finally to dispose of the Cuban crisis. To this end, Ambassador Stevenson and Mr. McCley presented on Wednesday a new draft of a joint statement which by new has certainly reached you. I wish to assure you that it is our purpose to end this affair as simply and clearly as possible.

You refer to the importance of my statements on an invasion of Cube and of our intention to fulfill them, so that no doubts are sown from the very start. I have already stated my position publicly in my press conference on November 20th, and I am glad that this statement appears to have your understanding; we have never wanted to be driven by the acts of others into war in Cuba. The other side of the coin, however, is that we do need to have adequate assurances that all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and are not re-introduced, and that Cuba itself commits no aggressive acts against any of the nations of the Western Hemisphere. As I understand you, you feel confident that Cuba will not in fact engage in such aggressive acts, and of course I already have your own assurance about the offensive weapons. So I myself should suppose that you could accept our position -- but it is probably better to leave final discussion of these matters to our representatives in New York. I

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED by // // // DATE / 2 7 //
() RELEASE () DECLASCRY in PART //
() EXGISE () DECLASCRY in PART //
() DENY () Non-responsive into //
FOI, EO of PACKEMPTIONS // TS SUTHERITY to //
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S OF () C, OADR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

quite agree with you that the larger part of the crisis has now been ended and we should not permit others to stand in the way of premptly settling the rest without further acrimony.

With regard to your reference to the confidential channels set up between us. I can assure you that I value them. I have not concealed from you that it was a serious disappointment to me that dangerously mislending information should have come through these channels before the recent crisis. You may also wish to know that by an accident or misunderstanding one of your diplomats appears to have used a representative of a private television network as a channel to us. This is always unwise in our country, where the members of the press efter insist on printing at some later time what they many learn privately.

Because our systems are so different, you may not be fully familiar with the practices of the American press. The competition for news in this country is florce. A number of the competitors are not great admirers of my Administration, and perhaps an even larger number are not wholly friendly to yours. Here in Washington we have 1200 reporters accredited to the White House alone, and thousands more in other assignments. Not one of them is accountable to this government for what he reports. It would be a great mistake to think that what appears in newspapers and magnines necessarily has anything to do with the policy and purpose of this government. I am glad to say that I have some friends among newspapermen, but no spokesmen.

But let me emphasize again that we do indeed value these confidential character. I entirely share your view that some trust is necessary for leading statesmen of our two countries; I believe that it is important to build the area of trust wherever possible. I shall of course continue to held and to express my convictions about the relative morits of our systems of government, and I will not be surprised if you do the same.

is particular, we have been very glad to have opportunities for private exchanges with and through Mr. Selshakov, and I am sorry to leave that he is returning to Moscow. It is our impression that he has made a real effort to improve communications and understanding

CONFIDENTIAL, OADA

between our two governments, and we shall miss him very

I appreciate your writing me so trankly, and in return I have tried to be as straightforward, for I agree with you that only through such frank exchanges can we better understand our respective points of view. Partly for this reason I refrained in mylast press conference from commenting on certain aspects of your speech before the Supreme Soviet with which you realise, of course, we could not agree.

We also are hopeful that care the Cuban crisis is being us, we shall be able to tackle the other problems confronting us and to find the path to their solution.

I cannot refrain from commissing briefly on your reference to the Gorman question, though I do not think that it would be useful in this mossage to expected our full position once again.

For here the vital interests of many states are involved -- on year side as well as ours. If this is recognized, then I am confident that a way can be found which will accommedate those interests and which will lead to a peaceful estilement. I cannot quite agree with you that Mr. Rusk and Mr. Grennyke have settled everything an Berlin but one issue. They are skillful and experienced diplomets, but I do not think we should give them too much credit yet.

到

I look forward to receiving your confidential letter and proposals on the test ben question, and I think there is every reason to keep working on this problem. I hope that in your message on this subject you will tell me what you think about the position of the people in Poking on this question. It seems to see very important for both of us that in our efforts to secure an end to nuclear testing we abould not everlock this area of the world.

CONFIDENTIAL, OADA

Thank you for your expressions of good wishes to me and my family, and let me in turn send you and your wife and family our personal good wishes for the coming year.

CONFIDENTIAL, OADR

## **EXCISED COPY FOLLOWS**



Dear Mr. Chairman:

I was glad to have your message of December 11th and to know that you believe, as we do, that we have come to the final stage of the Cuban affair between us, the actilement of which will have significance for our future relations and for our ability to overcome other difficulties. I wish to thank you for your expression of appreciation of the understanding and flexibility we have tried to display.

I have followed with close all intion the associations on the final settlement of the Cuban question between your representative, Mr. Kuznetsov, and our representatives, Ambassador Stevenson and Mr. McCloy, in New York. In these regotistions we have tried to understand your position and I am glad to note that Mr. Kuznetsov has also shown effort to understand our problems. It is clearly in the interest of both sides that we reach agreement on how finally to dispose of the Cuban crisis. To this end, Ambassador Stevenson and Mr. McCloy presented on Wednesday a new draft of a joint statement which by now has certainly reached you. I wish to assure you that it is our purpose to end this affair as simply and clearly as possible.

You refer to the importance of my statements on an invasion of Cuba and of our intention to fulfill them, so that no doubts are sown from the very start. I have already stated my position publicly in my press conference on November 20th, and I am glad that this statement appears to have your understanding; we have never wanted to be driven by the acts of others into var in Cuba. The other side of the coln, however, is that we do need to have adequate assurances that all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and are not reintroduced, and that Cuba itself commits no aggressive acts against any of the nations of the Western Hemisphere. As I understand you, you feel consident that Cuba will not in fact engage in such aggressive acts, and of course I already have your own assurance about the offensive weapons. So I myself should suppose that you could accept our position -- but it is probably better to leave final discussion of these matters to our representatives in New York. I

SANITIZED

NARS DATE IN 180



The state of the s

oulte agree with you that the larger part of the crisis has now been ended and we should not permit others to stand in the way of promptly settling the rest without further acrimony.

With regard to your reference to the confidential channels set up between us. I can assure you that I value them. I have not concealed from you that it was a serious disappointment to me that dangerously misleading information should have come through these channels before the recent crisis. You may also wish to know that by an accident or informative of a private television network as a channel used a representative of a private television network as a channel to us. This is always unvise in our country, where the members of the press often insist on private in our country, where the members of learn privately.

Because our systems are so different, you may not be fully familiar with the practices of the American press. The competition for news in this country is fierce. A number of the competitors are not great admirers of my Administration, and perhaps an even larger number are not wholly friendly to yours. Here in Washington we have 1200 reporters accredited to the White House alone, and thousands more in other assignments. Not one of them is accountable to this government for what he reports. It would be a great mistake to think that what appears in newspapers and magazines necessarily has anything to do with the policy and purpose of this government. I am glad to say that I have some friends among newspapermen, but no spokesmen.

But let me emphasize again that we do indeed value these confidential channels. I entirely share your view that nome trust is necessary tor leading statesmen of our two countries; I believe that it is important to build the area of trust wherever possible. I shall of course continue to hold and to express my convictions about the relative merits of our systems of government, and I will not be surprised if you do the same.



•




I appreciate your writing me so frankly, and in return I have tried to be as straightforward, for I agree with you that only through such frank exchanges can we better understand our respective points of view. Partly for this reason I refrained in mylest press conference from commenting on certain aspects of your speech before the Supreme Soviet with which you realize, of course, we could not agree.

We also are hopeful that once the Cuban crisis is behind us, we shall be able to tackle the other problems confronting us and to find the path to their solution.

I look forward to receiving your confidential letter and proposals on the test ban question, and I think there is every reason to keep working on this problem. I hope that in your message on this subject you will tell me what you think about the position of the people in Peking on this question. It seems to me very important for both of us that in our efforts to secure an end to nuclear testing we shalld not overlook this area of the world.





Thank you for your expressions of good wishes to me and my family, and let me in turn send you and your wife and family our personal good wishes for the coming year.

